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TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT: A REVIEW OF
SIGNIFICANT RECENT DECISIONS
ROBERT

A. LEvITT*

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' has entered its second
decade as an instrument for eradicating employment discrimination
based upon "race, color, zeligion, sex, or national origin. "2 During
the past decade vast changes have occurred in the racial and sexual
composition of the American work force; collective bargaining
agreements have been revised significantly; recruitment, testing,
and disciplinary policies have undergone substantial alteration; and
court calendars have become filled with equal employment opportunity cases. 3 Although the overall financial impact of Title VII
upon the employer is incalculable, an official of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)4 has estimated that more
than $100 million was recovered during one year-and-one-half
period in back pay and wage adjustments in the steel and communications industries alone.5 Presumably, because of the EEOC's
greatly expanded jurisdiction and power after adoption of the 1972
amendments to Title VII, 6 employment discrimination recoveries
will increase appreciably in the future.
*B.A., Brooklyn College; J.D., Brooklyn Law School. Industrial Relations Counselors Professor in Human Relations and Visiting Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(Supp. II, 1972).
2. The statute explicitly prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of these five
criteria on the part of an employer, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (Supp. 11, 1972), amending 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970), an employment agency, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1970), or a labor
organization, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (Supp. H, 1972), amending42U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1970).
The comprehensiveness of the prohibition is constrained, however, by the narrow definition
of employer, which, although expanded in 1972, still excludes a substantial portion of the
total labor force from Title VIE protection. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Supp. H, 1972).
3. The federal courts have jurisdiction of actions brought under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-6(f)(Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1970).
4. The EEOC is the administrative agency created to oversee the accomplishment of
the Act's purposes. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4(a) to -(g) (Supp. 1I, 1972), amending42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-4(a) to -(i) (1970).
5. Copus, New Directionsin Equal Employment, 27 N.Y.U. CoNF. LAB. 125, 145-46 (1974).
6. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, amending
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 20O0e-15 (1970). The 1972 amendments to Title VII brought within the
coverage of the Act employees of state and local governments, and the federal government,
all previously exempted, and expanded the coverage of smaller employers. The amendments
also grant the EEOC an independent right to sue in federal court to enforce Title VII. Prior
to the 1972 amendments the EEOC was limited to issuing a notice of right to sue to an
aggrieved individual after he filed his charge with the EEOC. For a general discussion of the

529

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:529

Enactment of Title VII has engendered two waves of litigation:
first came the cases that interpreted or established the basic law
under the Act, followed by back pay litigation, which has been
described as a "blood bath."'7 Recent Title VII decisions likewise
have raised complex obstacles to attempts to develop a workable
and realistic procedure to eliminate discrimination in employment.
A review of several of these recent developments, including the issues of seniority, sex discrimination, the interrelationship of Title
VII to existing federal legislation, the use of goals and quotas, and
the controversy surrounding the appropriate forum for obtaining
redress for alleged discriminatory practices, will indicate the fringes
of employment discrimination law that need refinement in the coming years.
IMPACT OF TITLE VII UPON THE SENIORITY SYSTEM
The authors of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 obviously were aware
of the potential impact of Title VII upon long-established seniority
systems. Section 703(h) of the Act specifically provided: "[lit shall
not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply
. . . different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pur8 Legislative
"8...
suant to a bona fide seniority . . . system .
not
intend to
did
Congress
that
history of Title VII also indicates
disturb bona fide seniority systems already in existence.' Notwithstanding this statutory language and legislative history, the courts
have held that seniority systems, racially neutral on their face, are

1972 amendments, see Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered:The EqualEmployment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WAsH. L. Rav. 824 (1972).
7. 87 LAB. REL. REP. 70 (Sept. 16, 1974) (statement by Michael H. Gottesman, attorney
for the United Steelworkers of America).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
9. For example, Senators Clark and Case, floor managers for the Act, submitted a memorandum to the Senate to explain the potential impact upon seniority systems. The memorandum stated in part:
Title VII would have no effect on established seniority rights. Its effect is pro-

spective and not retrospective. Thus, for example, if a business has been discriminating in the past and as a result has an all-white working force, when the

title comes into effect the employer's obligation would be simply to fill future
vacancies on a nondiscriminatory basis. He would not be obliged-or indeed,
permitted-to fire whites in order to hire Negroes, or to prefer Negroes for future
vacancies, or, once Negroes are hired, to give them special seniority rights at
the expense of the white workers hired earlier.
110 CONG. Rac. 7213 (1964).
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not bona fide systems if they operate to perpetuate the effects of
past discrimination. Commencing with the landmark decision in
Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc.,10 the courts have ordered sweeping

changes in the seniority provisions of many collective bargaining
agreements. Alterations have been required in the operation of

plantwide seniority,"1 job posting and bidding, 2 preference in
transfers, 13 "red circling" of rates for transferring minorities or
females,1 4 and special training programs.', Such a wholesale
attack has prompted one prominent union attorney to state: "It's

absolute madness for companies to function with anything less
than plant-wide seniority .

.

. I am amazed to see that many

companies are courting disaster.""
Recent indications are that the earlier court decisions may
foreshadow an even stronger attack on existing seniority systems. In
Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 17 a district court found that
women and blacks had in the past been discriminated against in

promotion, supervisory jobs, and job assignments. The court then
ordered the most sweeping remedy ever to correct employment dis-

crimination. First, the company was ordered to implement immediately a companywide posting and bidding system on every nonsupervisory job, whether vacant or filled, and, except for certain
named jobs, no job qualifications were to be required except "seniority and a willingness to learn the job." s Second, if an incumbent is
10. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973), noted in
Comment, The Georgia Power Case: Another FederalAgency Comes of Age, or "My God!
Our Employer-Client's Testing PracticesAre Being Challenged by the EEOC?!", 57 MARQ.
L. REv. 515 (1974); Rock v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 473 F.2d 1 44 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
907 (1973); Papermakers Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 919 (1970).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969);
EEOC v. Plumbers Local 189, 311 F. Supp. 468 (S.D. Ohio 1970), vacated on othergrounds,
438 F.2d 408 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 832 (1971); Dobbinsv. Electrical Workers Local
212, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
13. See, e.g., Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974). See
also 11 HousrON L. REv. 1296 (1974).
14. See, e.g., Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 321 F. Supp. 1241 (E.D. La. 1971). Seenote
19 infra & accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted,
95 S. Ct. 1421 (1975) (No. 74-728); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
16. 87 LAB. REL. RE. 70 (Sept. 16, 1974) (statement by Michael H. Gottesman).
17. 8 FEP Cases 778 (E.D. Va. 1974).
18. Id. at 783.
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displaced by a minority or female employee, he is to be downgraded
and "red-circled.' 9 Third, regarding supervisory jobs, no vacancies
were to be filled with other than females or blacks until the percentage of female and black supervisors approximates the percentage
of blacks and females included in the total work force for the relevant Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area. 2 The court acknowledged that the "bumping" involved "will undoubtedly create
morale problems, if not immediate economic problems, for those
displaced," but it considered the relief to be justified in view of
21
the employer's alleged past discrimination.
Likewise, the recent decisions in Watkins v. Steelworkers Local
23692? also indicate an increased willingness of the federal judiciary
to redraft existing seniority systems. In the first Watkins decision, 3
the court held that the standard provision in collective bargaining
agreements requiring the layoff first of the last-hired employee
("last-in, first-out") violated Title VII when a history of discrimination in hiring was demonstrated. This discrimination was held to
have prevented blacks and other minorities from accumulating the
seniority needed to avoid being the first laid off during an economic
slowdown. 24 This decision, however, ignored the clear legislative history of the Act, which had indicated that such recall provisions
would not be affected by the law. For example, Senator Clark, the
floor manager of the bill, submitted a statement from the Justice
Department interpreting Title VII which stated: "Title VII would
have no effect on seniority rights existing at the time it takes effect.
If, for example, a collective bargaining contract provides that in the
event of layoffs, those who were hired last must be laid off first, such
a provision would not be affected in the least by title VII." The
court overcame the import of the legislative history by ruling that
section 703(h)2 of the Act protected only bona fide seniority systems
19. Id. at 784. An employee is said to be "red circled" until the wage level for the job he
or she holds reaches the level at which he or she is being paid.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La. 1974) (liability); 8 FEP Cases 729 (E.D. La. 1974) (remedy).
23. 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La. 1974).
24. Id. at 1226.
25. 110 CoNr. REc. 7207 (1964). See also 110 CONG. REc. 6563-64 (1964) (remarks of Senator

Kuchel).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
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and that the procedure in Watkins was not bona fide. The court
also dismissed the objection that the black employees who would
benefit by the decision were not those who were denied employment
as a result of the original discrimination; the purpose of the relief
was to ensure that, although the company had refused to hire
blacks for twenty years, the plant would not operate without black
employees for the next decade because of the layoffs.2
In the second Watkins decision,? which directed the remedy, the
court ordered the company to reinstate a percentage of laid-off black
employees. The percentage remaining laid off was to be no larger
than the percentage of black employees in the work force when the
layoffs commenced." No employee currently working was to be laid
off as a result of this decision; instead, the available work was to be
apportioned among the entire work force until attrition or improved
economic conditions resulted in a "normalization" in the number of
employees. The decision had a particularly severe financial impact
upon the employer because the court also mandated that the entire
work force was to receive wages based on a normal 40-hour workweek, whether or not 40 hours of work actually were performed. 3'
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however, in Waters
v. Wisconsin Steel Works,32 reached a result opposite to that in
Watkins, holding that a last-in, first-out seniority system was lawful, even when prior discrimination in hiring had existed. Relying
on the Act's legislative history, the court found that Congress had
not intended to outlaw such a provision.- It distinguished this system from that present in cases dealing with departmental or job
27. 369 F. Supp. at 1228-29. The finding that the employer's seniority system was not bona
fide was based primarily upon a history of past discrimination. The court relied upon the
interpretation of section 703(h) given in Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 517
(E.D. Va. 1968). The court stated:
The defendants here cannot prevail under Ithe Quorles] standard: the seniority
system at the Harvey plant is discriminatory for the same reason that department or job seniority systems in formerly segregated plants are discriminatory-because blacks were in the past denied access to the seniority unit, and
were thereby prevented from accumulating relevant seniority.
Id. at 1228.
28. Id. at 1231.
29. 8 FEP Cases 729 (E.D. La. 1974).
30. Id. at 730.
31. Id.
32. 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), petitionfor cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3505 (U.S. Mar. 18,
1975)(No. 74-1064).
33. Id. at 1318-19.
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seniority systems, on the basis that in those cases blacks were given
seniority credit for time actually worked in formerly all-black jobs. 4
The court held that to give preference to blacks in a last-in, firstout situation would provide newly hired blacks with fictional seniority and would amount to preferential rather than remedial treatment.3 5 Moreover, the white employees would bear the burden of the
past discrimination, which had not been created by them, but by
their employer; Title VII, said the court, was "not designed to nurture such reverse discriminatory preferences." 36
Similarly, in Cox v. Allied Chemical Corp.,37 a federal district
court in Louisiana recently rejected the Watkins rationale by holding that black employees were estopped from challenging a layoff
system based upon seniority without a showing that they themselves are prevented from acquiring the necessary seniority because
of past employment discrimination. The court stressed that under
the "rightful place" theory, black employees are assured of the first
opportunity to move into vacancies in positions for which they are
qualified and which they would have occupied but for wrongful
discrimination. 5 In Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.," the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held a system of departmentwide seniority to be illegal because it locked in minority employees,
although discrimination against newly hired employees had ceased.
The court therefore required minority employees to be provided full
companywide seniority for transfer purposes "for a reasonable time
and for all purposes after transfer in the new department."4 But the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Jersey Central Power &
Light Co. v. IBEW Local Unions,4" held that a seniority system that
34. Id. at 1318, 1320.
35. Id. at 1319.
36. Id. at 1320. See also Slate, PreferentialRelief in Employment DiscriminationCases, 5
LoYoLA U.L.J. (Chicago) 315 (1974).
37. 382 F. Supp. 309 (M.D. La. 1974).

38. Id. at 319-20. The court concluded, however, that the collective bargaining contract in
question, which provided for the loss of unit seniority upon transfer from one unit to another,
did perpetuate the effects of past racial discrimination. Id. at 320. Therefore, the court found
that two blacks, who had maintenance-unit backgrounds, probably would have been transferred to the maintenance unit but for the unlawful seniority system. Hence, the layoffs of
these two black employees, while retaining junior white employees in the maintenance unit,
was unlawful. Id. at 321.
39. 495 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 1421 (1975) (No. 74-728).
40. Id. at 416.
41. 9 FEP CASES 117 (3d Cir. Jan. 30, 1975).

1975]

TITLE VII DEVELOPMENTS

provided for layoffs by reverse order of seniority was not contrary
to public policy, even though the court specifically found that female and minority group employees were disadvantaged by the system. Significantly, the court rejected the Watkins approach and
held that a plantwide, facially neutral seniority system was bona
fide within the meaning of section 703(h) of the Act, although it had
a disproportionate impact upon female and minority group workers
as a result of past employment discrimination.12 The court reasoned
from the legislative history that "Congress did not intend that a per
se violation of the Act occur whenever females and minority group
persons are disadvantaged by reverse seniority layoffs." 43
The question of the legality of "last-in, first-out" clauses, which
appear in the vast majority of collective bargaining agreements in
this country, is one of the most critical issues in the equal employment area at present. On the one hand, it is argued that they
threaten largely to undo the efforts of the last decade to eliminate
the effects of discrimination in employment; on the other hand, it
is contended that such clauses specifically are sanctioned by the
language and the legislative history of the Act which also proscribes
the creation of fictional seniority and preferential treatment. The
conflicting results in cases such as Watkins and Waters therefore
create a pressing need for Supreme Court resolution of this significant Title VII issue.
SEX DIsCRIMINATION
Sex discrimination in employment was the subject of several important decisions in 1974. The leading case involving discrimination
on the basis of sex was the Supreme Court's decision in Cleveland
Board of Educationv. LaFleur."1In LaFleur,the Court held that to
require pregnant teachers to leave their jobs five months in one case
and four months in a consolidated case45 before the birth of their
42. Id. at 128-29.
43. Id. at 129. See also United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 445 (5th
Cir. 1971); Note, Developments in the Law-Employment Discriminationand Title WI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. Rlv. 1109, 1159-60 (1971); Note, Business Necessity
Under Title VII of the CivilRights Act of 1964: A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YA= L.J. 98,
100-01 n.17 (1974).
44. 414 U.S. 632 (1974), aftig 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972), rev'g 326 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D.
Ohio 1971).
45. Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), rev'g 474 F.2d 395
(4th Cir. 1973), rev'g_326 F. Supp. 1159 (E.D. Va. 1971).
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children violated the fourteenth amendment due process clause. 6
The Court viewed the use of a mandatory maternity leave policy as
an arbitrary cutoff that bore no rational relationship to the states'
interests in preserving the continuity of instruction. The Court did
not determine, however, whether classifications based on sex are
inherently suspect.47
In Geduldig v. Aiello,4" the Supreme Court held that the California disability insurance program, which excluded disabilities resulting from a normal pregnancy and childbirth, did not violate the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Although
Aiello was not concerned directly with Title VII, it is now arguable
that disparate treatment based on pregnancy does not in and of
itself constitute illegal discrimination. 9 Application of Aiello to
Title VII suits has, however, resulted in a split among federal district courts. One court, relying on Aiello, refused to award disability
benefits allegedly due as a result of pregnancy,50 while four others
have reached the opposite conclusion, holding that the failure to
provide disability benefits to pregnant employees under a private
46. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. See generally Comment, Due Process and the Pregnant
Worker: The New Weapon in the Equal RightsArsenal, 23 EMORY L.J. 787 (1974); Comment,
Love's Labors Lost: New Conceptions of Maternity Leaves, 7 HARv.Civ. RIGHTs-CIv. LiM. L.
Rav. 260 (1972); Note, Equal Protectionand the Pregnancy Leave Case, 34 OHIo ST. L.J. 628
(1973); Note, LaFleur v. ClevelandBoard of Education:An UnarticulatedApplication of the
New Approach to Equal Protection, 35 U. Prrr. L. Ra,. 141 (1973); Comment, Mandatory
Maternity Leave: Title VII and Equal Protection, 14 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 1026 (1973); 23
DRAKx L. Ray. 690 (1974); 27 Sw. L.J. 542 (1973); 5 U. TOL. L. RPv. 366 (1974).
47. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). See generally Comment, Toward
Sexual Equality? An Analysis of Frontiero v. Richardson, 59 IowA L. REv. 377 (1973); 7
CREIGHTON L. REv. 69 (1973); 12 DUQUESNE L. Ray. 982 (1974); 51 J. URBAN L. 535 (1974); 5
LOYOLA U.L.J. (Chicago) 295 (1974); 5 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 348 (1974); 5 SEroN HALL L. RSv.
958 (1974); 48 TUL. L. Rlv. 710 (1974).
48. 94 S. Ct. 2485 (1974). See generally 27 VAND. L. Ra,. 551 (1974).
49. The result in Aiello may have been foreshadowed by the Court's decision only two
months earlier in Kahn v. Shevin, 94 S. Ct. 1734 (1974), which upheld a Florida statute that
gave widows, but not widowers, a special exemption from property taxes. Observing that
"[glender has never been rejected as an impermissible classification in all instances," the
Court held that discrimination by a state tax law in favor of a certain class is not unlawful if
based on a reasonable distinction or difference in state policy. Id. at 1737-38 n.10.
50. Communications Workers of America v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 379 F. Supp. 679
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd, 10 FEP CAsEs 435 (2d Cir. Apr. 5, 1975) (question of whether disparate
treatment of prenancy-related disabilities constitutes per se discrimination under the fourteenth amendment or Title VII). See also Newmon v. Delta Air Lines, 374 F. Supp. 238 (N.D.
Ga. 1973) (denial of sickness and disability benefits to a pregnant woman not sex discrimination under Title VII since pregnancy does not qualify as sickness or disability)(pre-Aiello
decision).
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insurance plan is violative of Title VII.5'
Alleged sex discrimination in employment directly affecting professional women confronted the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in Faro v. New York University, 2 the court holding that a
female associate professor properly was denied an injunction under
Title VII to prevent the University from terminating her employment. Refusing to be forced to judge the relative merits of professionals, the court stated that the plaintiff was no different from
hundreds of others who have to make adjustments in life when they
are unable to get the job they desire. 3
Beyond the question of discrimination based upon pregnancy, sex
discrimination issues largely are being treated by the EEOC and the
courts as part of the broader problem of discrimination against minority groups. Females, for example, are benefiting from decisions
dealing with seniority, promotions, quotas, and hiring because they
suffered from abuses in these areas which cannot be treated accurately as purely race or sex discrimination issues. Although the
proposed equal rights amendments may have some impact on this
51. Sale v. Waverly-Shell Rock Bd. of Educ., 9 FEP CAsrs 138 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 8, 1975);
Vineyard v. Hollister Elementary School Dist., 8 FEP Cases 1009 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Gilbert
v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Va. 1974); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 372
F. Supp. 1146 (W.D. Pa. 1974), rev'd, 9 FEP CASES 227 (3d Cir. Feb. 12, 1975).
The recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Wetzel v. Liberty
MutualIns. Co., 9 FEP CASES 227 (3d Cir. Feb. 12,1975), was the first appellate court opinion
on the issue of the relationship of Title VII to pregnancy and disability insurance. The court
ruled that an employer's income protection plan which does not provide for benefits for
disability due to pregnancy or for any disability related to pregnancy is violative of Title VII.
The court refused to accept "voluntariness" as a justification for the exclusion of pregnancy
benefits since the plan covered disabilities resulting from other voluntary activities (drinking,
smoking, athletic activities, etc.) and, as a result of religious beliefs and the imperfections of
contraceptives, pregnancy may not be voluntary. Id. at 232. The court also distinguished
Aiello on the grounds that an interpretation of a statute was involved, not the Constitution,
and that the plan in Wetzel excluded all, not just normal, pregnancy-related disabilities. Id.
at 229-30.
52. 502 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1974).
53. Id. at 1232. The court pointed out that of 20 equally brilliant law graduates in a law
firm, only one gets the partnership, although the other 19 are almost equally qualified;
likewise, of 50 junior bank officers, all of whom want to be vice-presidents, only one is chosen.
The court also analogized to the difficulties judges have in choosing law clerks from the many
applicants who possess equally outstanding qualifications. Id.
54. S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess (1971).
See generally Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A ConstitutionalBasis for Equal Rights for Women, 80YAixL.J. 871 (1971); Note, Sex Discrimination
and Equal Protection:Do We Need a ConstitutionalAmendment?, 84 HAnv. L. Rnv. 1499

(1971).
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trend, it thus appears that sex discrimination issues are being engulfed by more general considerations.
THE INTERRELATIONSHIP

OF TITLE VII WITH

EXISTING

FEDERAL

LEGISLATION

NationalLabor Relations Act
Several important recent decisions indicate that the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB), pursuant to its authority under the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),55 will play a more active role
in equal employment opportunity cases. The Board's position regarding its responsibility in the area of employment discrimination
primarily emanates from the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit in NLRB v. Mansion House Center Management
Corp.5 6 In Mansion House, the employer appealed from an order to
bargain on the ground that the union was guilty of racial discrimination. This position initially was rejected by the Board, 7 but the
court of appeals reversed, requiring the use of the following guidelines: (1) the claim that a union is guilty of racial discrimination is
a relevant area of inquiry for the NLRB when that defense is presented to the Board in a refusal to bargain case;-" (2) the machinery
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, is not available
to unions that are unwilling to correct past practices of racial discrimination; 59 and (3) evidence concerning racial imbalance in
union membership is relevant to such an inquiry since statistical
evidence may establish that a union has been guilty of past racial
discrimination. 0 The court specifically held that the fact that
minority group applicants have not been rejected by the union is
not the sole test of discrimination. 1
The Board now appears to be relying upon Mansion House in
55. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970).

56. 473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1973). See generally Comment, The Civil Rights Potentialof the
Labor Management Relations Act: The CurrentApproach, 12 DuQuEsN L. REv. 23 (1973);
Note, The Impact of De Facto Discrimination by Unions on the Availability of NLRB
Bargaining Orders, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1353 (1974).
57. Mansion House Center Management Corp., 190 N.L.R.B. 437, 77 L.R.R.M. 1283
(1971).
58. 473 F.2d at 474.
59. Id. at 477.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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certification cases. For example, in Bekins Moving & Storage Co.,62
the employer sought to have the NLRB refuse certification to a
union that allegedly discriminated against women and Spanishsurnamed individuals. The Board held that an employer properly
could object to certification of the union within five days from the
issuance of the tally of ballots cast in a representation election if the
union was guilty of alleged discrimination against minorities. 3 Two
Board members (Miller and Jenkins) ruled that the fifth amendment prohibited the Board from certifying a union that engaged in
invidious discrimination as a bargaining representative. 6 A third
member (Kennedy) agreed that the Board was foreclosed from certifying a union that discriminated on the basis of race, alienage, or
national origin,6" but he did not agree that the Board could deny
certification on the basis of sex discrimination because the Supreme
Court has refused to find classifications based on sex inherently
suspect." The other two members (Fanning and Penello) dissented
on the ground that withholding certification on the basis of discrimination was neither required by the Constitution nor permitted by
the NLRA.6 7
Since Bekins, the Board has indicated that it will proceed slowly
in denying certification to a union on the basis of alleged
discrimination. 8 For example, in GrantsFurniturePlaza,Inc.," the
employer submitted statistical evidence allegedly showing that the
percentage of female and Spanish-surnamed members in the union
was lower than the ratio of such persons to the total population in
the local metropolitan area. The employer also introduced evidence
of a Department of Justice complaint alleging that the international
union had perpetuated prior discriminatory practices against
minority group individuals. The Board found both types of evidence
insufficient reason to deny certification" because the unproven Jus62. 211 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 86 L.R.R.M. 1323 (1974).
63. Id. at -, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1328.
64. Id. at , 86 L.R.R.M. at 1325.
65. Id. at ., 86 L.R.R.M. at 1329.
66. Id. at.---, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1330 n.29. He would consider, however, allegations of sex
discrimination raised as a breach of the duty of fair representation after the union has been
certified.
67. Id. at , 86 L.R.R.M. at 1332.
68. See Grants Furniture Plaza, Inc., 213 N.L.R.B. No. 80, 87 L.R.R.M. 1175 (1974); Bell
& Howell Co., 213 N.L.R.B. No. 79, 87 L.R.R.M. 1172 (1974).
69. 213 N.L.R.B. No. 80, 87 L.R.R.M. 1175 (1974).
70. Id. at
, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1176.
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tice Department allegations did not corroborate adequately the alleged statistical imbalance, without proof that the union actually
exercised control over the composition of the work force. 7' Following
his concurring opinion in Bekins, Member Kennedy did not address
the merits of the issue of sex discrimination, stating that certification could not be denied on the ground of sex discrimination; 2 he
did agree, however, that statistics alone were not a reliable indication of discrimination in union membership since statistical imbalances might reflect merely the total composition of the unit that the
union was obligated to represent. 73 Members Fanning and Penello
concurred in the certification of the union for the reasons they had
expressed in their Bekins dissent.7 4
The absence of unanimity in Bekins, coupled with the exacting
proof requirements of later Board decisions, leaves the question of
denial of certification because of alleged union discrimination somewhat in doubt; the expiration of Chairman Miller's term in December 1974 and the unascertainable viewpoint of his successor7 5 do not
help resolve this uncertainty. The recent Supreme Court decision in
Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community
Organization,76 however, may indicate the general line of demarcation between the operation of Title VII and the NLRA in collective
bargaining situations.
Western Addition involved the discharge of two black employees
for engaging in picketing and handbilling activities in order to protest their employer's alleged discriminatory employment practices.
71. Id. at .- , 87 L.R.R.M. at 1176.
72. Id. at_,
87 L.R.R.M. at 1177. See note 66 supra & accompanying text.
73. Id. at
, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1177.
74. Id. at.,
87 L.R.R.M. at 1177. See note 67 supra & accompanying text.
75. Betty Southard Murphy, a former Administrator with the Wage-Hour Division of the
Department of Labor, was confirmed by the Senate as the new Chairman of the NLRB in
February 1975. 88 LAB. REL. REP. 113 (Feb. 10, 1975).
76. 95 S. Ct. 977 (1975). For a discussion of the court of appeals decision reversed in
Western Addition, see Note, Racial Discriminationin Employment and the Remedy of SelfHelp: An Unwarranted Addition, 15 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 615 (1974). See also Craver,
Minority Action versus Union Exclusivity: The Need to Harmonize NLRA and Title VIU
Policies,26 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1974); Gould, RacialProtestand Self-Help Under Taft-Hartley:
The Western Addition Case, 29 ARB. J. (n.s.) 161 (1974); Case Note, Labor Law-Interaction
of Title VII and the NationalLaborRelationsAct-Union Exclusivity and IndividualRights,
15 B.C. IND. & Cois. L. Rav. 1029 (1974); Note, Employer Discrimination:How FarDoes
NLRB JurisdictionReach?, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 1078 (1974); Note, Title VII and NLRA:
Protectionof Extra-Union Oppositionto Employment Discrimination,72 MicH. L. REV. 313
(1973).
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The union simultaneously was processing a grievance on the issue.
The NLRB dismissed the complaint of unfair labor practices committed in the discharge because the employees' picketing was in
derogation of the union's status as exclusive bargaining agent.7 The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, however,
reversed the Board's decision 78 and remanded the case to determine
whether "the union was actually remedying the discrimination to
the fullest extent possible, by the most expedient and efficacious
7
means."
Western Addition thus posed the question of whether attempts to
remedy racial discrimination in employment by engaging in separate bargaining with the employer are protected by section 780 of the
the NLRA or proscribed by section 9(a).11 The Supreme Court
stressed its "long and consistent adherence to the principle of exclusive representation tempered by safeguards for the protection of
minority interests," and refused to fashion the "limited exception,"
urged by the respondent, that "employees who seek to bargain separately with their employer as to the eliminatidn of racially discriminatory employment practices peculiarly affecting them, should be
77. The Emporium, 192 N.L.R.B. 173, 77 L.R.R.M. 1669 (1971).
78. Western Addition Community Organization v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
The two primary cases that previously had dealt with the issue of employee self-help were
NLRB v. R.C. Can Co., 328 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1964), enforcing 140 N.L.R.B. 588,52 L.R.R.M.
1071 (1963) (protected concerted activity found where union and "quickie" strike had same
purpose), and NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 419 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1969), denying
enforcement to 166 N.L.R.B. 551, 65 L.R.R.M. 1502 (1967) (picketing lost its protected status
because in derogation of the bargaining representative). See also Getman, The Protectionof
Economic Pressure by Section 7of the NationalLaborRelationsAct, 115 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1195
(1967); Gould, Black Power in the Unions: The Impact Upon Collective Bargaining
Relationships, 79 YALE L.J. 46 (1969); Koretz & Rabin, The Development and History of
ProtectedConcerted Activity, 24 S-mAcusE L. REv. 715 (1973).
79. 485 F.2d at 931.
80. Section 7 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may
be affected by any agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as
a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3).
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
81. Section 9(a) provides in part: "Representatives designated or selected for the purposes
of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such
purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining. . .

"

Id. § 159(a).
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free from the constraints of the exclusivity principle of § 9(a)."82
Given the potential for conflict between the various 'minorityemployee groups who might demand a right to bargain with the
employer, the Court reasoned that the basic national labor policy
of exclusive recognition would be undermined seriously if the
exception were imposed." Similarly, the Court held that the congressional policy of protecting from reprisal employee efforts to oppose unlawful discrimination, as expressed in section 704(a) of Title
VII, 8 4 did not protect the picketing employees from discharge. 5 The
Court also rejected the argument that the remedies provided by
Title VII were inadequate because such a contention properly
should be addressed to the Congress, not the courts or the NLRB 5. G
The Court thus answered in the negative several basic questions
of labor law, including the following: whether minority employees
may strike to compel their employer to bargain concerning racial
matters, even though the employer must recognize the union as the
exclusive bargaining representative of its employees; whether the
NLRA protects minority actions that are in derogation of, and
unsanctioned by, the union representative; and whether Title VII
requires protection of activities of minority employees concerning
racial discrimination that otherwise would be unprotected by the
82. 95 S. Ct. at 986.
83. The Court stated:
The policy of industrial self-determination as expressed in §7 does not require
fragmentation of the bargaining unit along racial or other lines in order to
consist with the national labor policy against discrimination. And in the face of
such fragmentation, whatever its effect on discriminatory practices, the bargaining process that the principle of exclusive representation is meant to lubricate could not endure unhampered.
Id. at 989.
84. Section 704(a) provides in part: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because [the employee] has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subehapter ..
42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1970).

85. The Court stated:
Even assuming that § 704(a) protects employees' picketing and instituting a
consumer boycott of their employer, the same conduct is not necessarily entitled
to affirmative protection from the NLRA. . . . If the discharges in this case are
violative of § 704(a) of Title VII, the remedial provisions of that title provide
the means by which [the discharged employees] may recover their jobs with
back pay.
Id. (footnote omitted).
86. Id. at 990.
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Taft-Hartley Act.8 7 The Western Addition decision therefore suggests the boundary between Title VII and the NLRA: the NLRA
seemingly will not be expanded to encompass employment discrimination questions if such expansion threatens the policy of exclusive
representation. Redress for alleged discrimination by employers

must be sought through the union or through standard Title VII
remedial channels, rather than by filing an unfair labor practice
charge with the NLRB.89 Although this constraint may make minority union members "prisoners of the union," 9 the duty of fair representation" currently imposed upon the union should be an effective

method to ensure protection of minority-employee rights.
The Equal Pay Act of 1963

In Corning Glass Works v. Brennan," the Supreme Court rendered its first decision under the Equal Pay Act of 1963.92 At a time
when applicable state laws prohibited night work by women, the
employer in Corning set up a night shift for inspectors and assigned

male employees exclusively to the job. The males demanded and
received substantially higher rates than females received on the day
shift. 3 Subsequently, the plant was organized and the union negoti87. See generally 87 LAB. REL. REP. 122-23 (Oct. 7, 1974).
88. The Court stated: "Questions arising under Title VII must be resolved by the means
that Congress provided for that purpose." 95 S. Ct. at 989 n.25. Accordingly, a minority
employee who pursues his grievance to arbitration remains free to relitigate the claim in
federal court. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 94 S. Ct. 1011 (1974). See notes 142-45 infra
& accompanying text.
89. 95 S. Ct. at 990 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
90. See generally Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S.
248 (1944); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
91. 94 S. Ct. 2223 (1974). See generally 44 Mss. L.J. 1028 (1973); 5 ST. MARY's L.J. 409
(1973).
92. The Equal Pay Act of 1963 was enacted as section 6(d) of the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970). The Act specifically prohibits discrimination by
employers on the basis of sex in the wages paid for "equal work on jobs the performance of
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar
working conditions. . . ... Id.
Title VII recognizes the overlap in coverage between the two Acts and provides in section
703(h): "It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any
employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or
compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is
authorized by the provisions of [the Equal Pay Act]." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970). The
EEOC follows the equal pay interpretations of the Wage and Hour Administrator of the
Department of Labor, but is not bound by them. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.8 (1973).
93. 94 S. Ct. at 2226.
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ated a collective bargaining agreement that enacted for the first
time a system of plantwide shift differentials. The differentials,
however, were superimposed on the existing differences in base pay
between male night inspectors and female day inspectors. 4 Several
years later the applicable state laws were amended to permit women
to work at night, and after the enactment of the Equal Pay Act in
1963, the company began to hire women for the night shift. Thereafter, a new collective bargaining agreement was signed abolishing
different rates of pay for day- and night-shift inspectors and establishing a uniform pay rate. Although all inspectors hired after January 1969 received the same rate of pay regardless of sex or shift, the
agreement perpetuated the higher salary paid to those male nightshift inspectors employed before January 1969, with the result that
the differential between certain night and day inspectors was continued.' ' The Supreme Court reached the following conclusions: (1)
that the inspection work, whether performed during the day or
night, was "equal work" within the meaning of the law;9" (2) that
the nightshift premium originally paid to men on the night shift was
sex-related, not a differential "based on any other factor other than
sex" within the exception to the Act;9" (3) that the employer did not
cure the violation by allowing women to work as night inspectors,
rather than by equalizing the pay of female day inspectors and male
night inspectors; 8 (4) and that the employer did not absolve itself
of a violation of the Act in 1969 when it equalized the pay for day
and night inspectors, since it perpetuated the discrimination by
continuing the pay differential for those previously on the job.9
Age Discriminationin Employment Act
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,100 which covers some 37 million persons between the ages of 40 and 65, has just
begun to emerge from the shadows of Title VII. Indeed, while the
period of the 1960's was marked by major advances in equal employ94. Id. at 2227.
95. Id. at 2227-28.
96. Id. at 2232.
97. Id. at 2233 n.25.
98. Id. at 2234.
99. Id. at 2235.
100. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1970). See generally Note, DiscriminationAgainst the Elderly:
A Prospectus of the Problem, 7 SUFFoLK U.L. REV. 917 (1973).
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ment opportunity for minorities, and the early 1970's by advances

for women, it is likely that the second half of this decade will see
great strides towards the elimination of age discrimination.
Unlike the quantity of litigation concerning race and sex discrimination, there have been few significant court decisions under this
law to date. In Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co.," ' however, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the employer did
not violate the law when it required an employee to retire at age 60
under the terms of a profit-sharing retirement plan. The court found
that the plan, although not qualified under the Internal Revenue
Code,'12 fell within the Act's exception for bona fide pension plans.'
Based upon this exception, which provides that "no such employee
benefit plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual.. *., ,104
the plaintiff also contended that the employer was required to rehire
him after his forced retirement. The court rejected this claim, however, reasoning that to require reemployment by the same employer
of one legally retired would render the exception of bona fide pension plans meaningless; if retired employees must be rehired immediately, the court stated, the right to insist upon compliance with
the plan would be an illusion." 5
Another recent decision involving the Age Dis.crimination in
Employment Act upheld a bus company's policy of refusing to hire
persons 35 years of age or older as intercity bus drivers.' 5 The Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined that the company
policy was legitimate under an exception to the Act permitting age
differentiations if age is shown to be "a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
particular business. . .. ,,117 The company was found to have demonstrated that its policy was not arbitrary, but based upon a goodfaith judgment concerning the safety needs of its passengers. 8
The Department of Labor has pursued various tacks to remedy
age discrimination. It recently has attempted to reach settlement
101. 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974).
102. INT. REV. CODs OF 1954, §§ 401-04.

103. 500 F.2d at 215-16.
104. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1970).
105. 500 F.2d at 218.
106. Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S.
Ct. 805 (1975).
107. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1970).
108. 499 F.2d at 865.
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agreements with employers who have been accused of age discrimination; for example, in May 1974 the Department arranged a twomillion-dollar settlement for 160 employees of Standard Oil of California who had been laid off or forced to retire prior to their normal
retirement age.' 9 More recently, the Department announced institution of the largest suit ever filed under the Act against the Baltimore & Ohio and Chesapeake & Ohio Railroads, seeking more than
$20 million in back pay and other relief for 300 present and former
employees.
The recently expanded role of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act as part of the employment discrimination practitioner's
arsenal is illustrative of nonexclusivity of Title VII in this area of
labor relations law. In addition to the recognized statutory overlap
between Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, and the unresolved issues
regarding the NLRB's role in collective bargaining situations affected by discrimination questions, this last interface emphasizes
the need to consider carefully the interrelationship between the
Civil Rights Act and other federal legislation.
THE USE OF GOALS AND QUOTAS

The imposition of "goals" or "quotas" to remedy the effects of
past discrimination has become a source of major controversy in the
Title VII area. Section 703(j) of the Act states that nothing in the
law shall require an employer to grant "preferential treatment"
solely because of a racial imbalance in the work force.' During the
legislative debates, Senator Clark stressed: "[T]he suggestion that
racial balance or quota systems would be imposed by this proposed
legislation is entirely inaccurate."112 Nevertheless, the courts almost
109. Address by W.J. Kilberg, Solicitor of Labor, Civil Rights Symposium, Kansas City,
Mo., Oct. 7, 1974, in 87 LAB. REL. REP. 168 (Oct. 14, 1974).
110. Id.
111. Section 703(j) provides in part:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer

. .

. [or] labor organization.

. .

to grant preferential treatment to any

individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist
with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color,
*religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer. . . [or] admitted
to membership or classified by any labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training program. ...
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970).
112. 110 CONG. REc. 7207 (1964). The floor managers of the bill reported to the Senate:
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uniformly have held that this section must be read in connection
with the basic purposes of the Act and the very broad grant of power
to the federal courts to frame affirmative relief. Consequently,
courts have ordered unions to refer employees on an alternate onefor-one black-white ratio,113 to admit to membership specified percentages of minorities,' and to admit minimum percentages of
minorities to apprentice programs.115 Similarly, employers have
been ordered to hire minorities on a fixed-percentage basis such as
one-for-one or one-for-two,118 to hire on the basis of minimum qualiat all,11 and to provide special training
fications or no qualifications
118
women.
for minorities and
It had been hoped that the Supreme Court would rule definitively
on the legality of the use of goals and quotas in DeFunis v.
119 concerning a student who had been denied admission
Odegaard,
to law school although he had been inducted into Phi Beta Kappa
in college and had been graduated magna cum laude. DeFunis
charged that blacks and other minorities received special considera"There is no requirement in Title VII that an employer maintain a racial balance in his work
force. On the contrary, any deliberate attempt to maintain a racial balance, whatever such a
balance may be, would involve a violation of title VII because maintaining such a balance
would require an employer to hire or to refuse to hire on the basis of race." Id. at 7213
(Interpretive Memorandum submitted jointly by Senators Clark and Case). SenatorWilliams
remarked:
[Tio hire a Negro solely because he is a Negro is racial discrimination, just as
much as a "white only" employment policy. Both forms of discrimination are
prohibited by title VII of this bill. The language of that title simply states that
race is not a qualification for employment. Every man must be judged according
to his ability. . . . Those who say that equality means favoritism do violence
to commonsense.
Id. at 8921.
113. See, e.g., United States v. Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d
Cir.), cert. denled,'412 U.S. 939 (1973); United States v. Carpenters Local 169, 457 F.2d 210
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 851 (1972).
114. See, e.g., Vulcan Soc'y v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973).
115. See, e.g., Southern Ill. Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
116. See, e.g., Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333
(2d Cir. 1973); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950
(1972); Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 348 F. Supp. 1084 (1972), modified, 473 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir.
1973) (hiring procedures affirmed).
117. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Altshuler, 361 F. Supp. 1293 (1973),
aff'd, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 1971 (1974).
118. See, e.g., Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 173 (1975).
119. 94 S. Ct. 1704 (1974). See generallyFlaherty & Shead, DeFunis,the EqualProtection
Dilemma: Affirmative Action and Quotas, 12 DuQUESNE L. Rn'. 745 (1974); DeFunis: The
Road Not Taken, A Symposium, 60 VA. L. REv. 917 (1974); 11 HousToN L. REv. 1298 (1974).
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tion and preference in law school admissions, that 36 of the 37
minority students who were admitted had predicted first-year averages lower than his and that 30 of those students would have been
rejected summarily if they had been white.12 The Court, however,
did not reach the question of quotas; rather, because DeFunis was
graduating from the law school after a lower court had ordered him
admitted, the Court held that the case was moot. 2 ' Justice Douglas
filed a strong dissent emphasizing that "[tihere is no constitutional right for any race to be preferred" and that the "Equal Protection Clause commands the elimination of racial barriers, not
their creation in order to satisfy our theory as to how society ought
to be organized. ' ' 12- He stressed that if admissions were to be based
upon quotas, problems would arise regarding determination of
which groups, and in what proportion, were to receive favored treatment, aggravated by the difficulties of determining which particular
individuals were members of which groups. 123 He also stated: "[I]f
discrimination based on race is constitutionally permissible when
those who hold the reins can come up with 'compelling' reasons to
justify it, then constitutional guarantees acquire an accordionlike
quality.' ' 12 4 Although the Court did not provide the needed clarification in DeFunis, it ultimately must confront the difficult question
of whether quotas and "benign" reverse discrimination'2 are constitutional.
Problems inherent in the use of quotas are illustrated by the
recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638.26 The court held that section 703(j) '2
of Title VII does not prevent the courts from ordering a union to
have a minimum of 30 percent non-white members by 1977 and
at least 30 percent of the same group enrolled in apprenticeship
classes each year to correct a history of discrimination in
120. 94 S. Ct. at 1710 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 1707.
122. Id. at 1716, 1718.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1719.
125. See generally Ely, The Constitutionalityof Reverse Racial Discrimination,41 U. CHI.
L. Rnv. 723 (1974); Slate, PreferentialRelief in Employment DiscriminationCases, 5 LoYoLA
U.L.J. (Chicago) 315 (1974); Comment, The Myth of Reverse Race Discrimination:An HistoricalPerspective, 23 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 319 (1974).
126. 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970). See note 111 supra.
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membership.1rs Although conceding that its decision might appear

to violate that section's prohibition of preferential treatment, the
court held that the section was not applicable to quotas designed
to eradicate the effects of past discrimination."
Judge Hays dissented forcefully in Rios on the ground that the
court's conclusion was not supported by the language of the Act or
the legislative history.'30 Discussing the legislative history at length,
he stated that section 703() is "not concerned with the causes of
imbalance, past, present or future. It provides for no exception from
its broad prohibition for imbalances caused by past discrimination."3 ' He concluded: "Judicial resort to racial classification is
designed to make racism respectable. It gives legal sanction to the

unfortunate attitudes which have resulted in the exclusion of minor-

13 2
ities from the mainstream of the nation's economy."
In Boston Chapter,NAACP v. Beecher,1 1' the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit cited Rios with approval, sustaining a lower
court order' directing a municipal fire department to hire a specific

ratio of minority applicants. The court found that discrimination
had resulted in the past from the use of tests that were not job128. 501 F.2d at 628.
129. Id. at 630-31. For a similar approach to the impact of section 703() upon the use of
quotas, see United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 553-54 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 172 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971); United States v. Local 38, IBEW, 428 F.2d 144, 14951 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970). In Local 38 IBEW, the court stated that
section 703() "cannot be construed as a ban on affirmative relief against continuation of
effects of past discrimination. . . .Any other interpretation would allow complete nullification of the stated purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." 428 F.2d at 149-50.
130. 501 F.2d at 634.
131. Id. Judge Hays continued:
The legislative history of section 703(j) makes it abundantly clear that Congress intended Title VII to require unions and employers to accept members and
to hire employees without regard to race. Quotas, for whatever reason imposed,
fly in the face of that intent. Nowhere in the comprehensive reports ofthe House
Judiciary Committee, and nowhere in the 534 hours of Senate debate is there
as much as an oblique suggestion that Congress intended to permit courtordered racial quotas 'to eradicate the effects of past discriminatory practices.'
On the contrary, the prohibition against racial preference in section 703(j) is
comprehensive. The majority's ruling today completely fails to give effect to
that prohibition.
Id. at 636-37.
132. Id. at 639.
133. 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 1561 (1975).
134. 371 F. Supp. 507 (D. Mass. 1974).
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related 35 and which had had a disparate effect on black and
Spanish-surnamed applicants.13 The court indicated that section
703(j) was applicable only to cases in which racial imbalance had
resulted irrespective of the actions of the employer. 37 The legislative
intent, the court found, was evidenced by the failure of Congress in
the debates preceeding the 1972 amendments to pass the Dent
amendment,' 3 which would have foreclosed all affirmative action
plans; thus, the court concluded that Congress impliedly ratified
the power of the courts to impose the color-conscious relief being
employed at the time of the 1972 amendments.'39
The question of the implementation of goals and quotas by the
federal judiciary to obtain a magical proportion of minority employees remains one of the most emotional issues in the Title VII
area. What many characterize as a necessary tool in the effort to
correct two centuries of employment discrimination is attacked by
an equally large number of detractors, who characterize quotas as
"reverse discrimination" merely substituting one evil for another.4 0
135. 504 F.2d at 1022-24. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See also
Blumrosen, Strangersin Paradise:Griggs v. Duke PowerCo. and the Concept of Employment
Discrimination,71 Mici. L. REv. 59 (1972); Wilson, A Second Look At Griggs v. Duke Power
Company: Ruminations on Job Testing, Discriminationand the Role of the FederalCourts,
58 VA. L. Rzv. 844 (1972); Note, Employment Testing: The Aftermath of Griggs v. Duke
Power Company, 72 CoLUM. L. REv. 900 (1972).
136. 504 F.2d at 1021. Under the lower court's decree, four eligibility groups were created:
(1) all black and Spanish-surnamed applicants who took and failed the previous test, but who
passed a new, valid test; (2) all persons on the current eligibility list; (3) all black and
Spanish-surnamed persons who did not belong in group (1), but who passed a new test and
were qualified; and (4) all other persons who passed the new test. Persons in the first two
groups were to be given initial preference on a one-to-one basis and those from the latter two
were to be drawn upon after groups (1) and (2) were exhausted. The decree was to remain in
effect until the fire department had a percentage of minority firemen approximately equal
to the percentage of minorities in the locality. In no case was an unqualified minority person
to be appointed. Id. at 1026-27.
See also Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under FairEmployment Laws: A General
Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARv. L. Rnv. 1598, 1637-69
(1969).
137. 504 F.2d at 1028.
138. See generally Comment, The PhiladelphiaPlan: A Study in the Dynamics of Executive Power, 39 U. CI. L. REv. 723, 747-57 (1972).
139. 504 F.2d at 1028.
140. See, e.g., Ely, The Constitutionalityof Reverse RacialDiscrimination,41 U. CH. L.
Rav. 723 (1974); Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-The
Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 363, 367-88 (1966); Karst & Horowitz,
Affirmative Action and EqualProtection, in DeFunis: The Road Not Taken, A Symposium,
60 VA. L. Rav. 917, 955 (1974); Developments in the Law-Employment Discriminationand
Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. Rav. 1109, 1113-18 (1971).
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This dispute is heightened by the apparent conflict between the
language of the statute and legislative history and the rampant use
of quotas by the courts. Although the court of appeals in Beecher
characterized this dispute as "ancient history,""4 ' Judge Hay's dissent in Rios and the Supreme Court's irresolution in DeFunis indicate that it remains very much alive.
APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR REDRESS

In its recent decision in Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo., the
Supreme Court appears to have reversed, or at least severely weakened, the policy of deferral to arbitration awards granted in labor
disputes pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement that provides for binding arbitration.4 3 In Alexander, the Court held that a
discharged minority employee, who unsucessfully sought to resolve
by arbitration his reinstatement claim on the ground that his discharge was discriminatory, nevertheless may pursue his Title VII
claim in federal court.1" The federal judiciary, therefore, will neither defer to the arbitration process in Title VII actions, nor apply
the doctrine of res judicata to arbitration awards. The Court, however, indicated that when an arbitration decision gives full consideration to Title VII rights, a court may give such a decision "great
weight," particularly if the issue is solely one of fact and if the award
is based upon an adequate record. '
A result very similar to Alexander was reached recently by the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Batiste v. Furnco ConstructionCorp.,"' the court holding that the decision of a state equal
employment opportunity agency would not bar a Title VII claim in
141. 504 F.2d at 1028.
142. 94 S. Ct. 1011 (1974). See generally Isaacson & Zifchak, FairEmployment Forums
AfterAlexander v. Gardner-DenverCo.: Separate and Unequal, 16 WM. & MAnv L. Ray. 439
(1974); Oppenheim, Gateway and Alexander-Whither Arbitration?, 48 Tr. L. REv. 973
(1974); Siegel, Deferral to ArbitrationAwards in Title VIlActions, 25 LAB. L.J. 398 (1974).
143. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
144. 94 S.Ct. at 1025.
145. Id. at n.21.
146. 503 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S.Ct. 1127 (1975). The employees
appealed from the federal district court judgment, 350 F. Supp. 10 (N.D. Ill. 1972), which
although granting them summary judgment on their complaint of racially discriminatory
employment practices, denied them all injunctive and compensatory relief requested other
than $400 in attorney fees.
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federal court under the doctrines of election of remedies and res
judicata.17 A decision by the Illinois Fair Employment Practices
Commission awarding back pay to minority group bricklayers,
therefore, did not bar de novo consideration by the federal district
court.14 8 The court specifically rejected the argument that full faith
and credit must be afforded to the state determination, because the
court found "a strong Congressional policy that plaintiffs not be
deprived of their right to resort to the federal courts for adjudication
of their federal claims under Title VII." The court, however, found
that, by entering summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the basis
of the state agency's ruling, the district court had erred; the court
reasoned: "While a defendant can be required to defend again, it
cannot be forced to accept the prior findings, and the federal court
must conduct its own inquiry."'' 0
Alexander and Batiste indicate that there is no hesitation by the
federal courts to preserve their statutory function as the "final arbiters" of employment discrimination disputes."5 ' Questions may arise
regarding the most efficacious means to resolve these disputes because of the roadblock thus imposed to the use of nonjudicial remedies, but, conceivably, further refinement in other methods of dispute resolution, such as arbitration and state administrative proceedings, will permit greater confidence to be placed in these alternatives by the federal judiciary. At present, however, employers
must be prepared to defend an employment discrimination claim in
more than one forum.
CONCLUSION

As Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 embarks upon its
second decade of reform in employment practices, it is clear that
significant issues await resolution. Although the use of quotas to
redress past discrimination and the availability of sick leave benefits for pregnant employees have attracted substantial publicity,
other important issues, such as the appropriateness of nonjudicial
forums for resolution of Title VII disputes and the legitimacy of
seniority systems when they perpetuate past discrimination, also
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

503 F.2d at 450.
Id. at 451.
Id. at 450. Accord, Cooper v. Philip Morris, Inc., 464 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1972).
503 F.2d at 451. See Batiste v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 350 F. Supp. 10 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
See note 3 supra & accompanying text.
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confront the labor lawyer. An impressive start has been made towards the national goal of providing equal employment opportunities to all citizens regardless of their "race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin"; nevertheless, extensive litigation will be necessary
to resolve the many questions that remain.

